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The Civil Docket:
From Civil Rights
to Social Security
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 433-445. 0 2002 American Bar Association.
The Supreme Court's 2001 term, with a large
number of 5-4 decisions and decisions with sepa-
rate concurrences, exhibited the continuing divi-
sion between the wing of the Court consisting of
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Kennedy and the wing consisting of
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens,
with Justice O'Connor providing the swing vote in
many cases. This grouping reflects the alignment
in the per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98 (2000).
Of course, there were decisions in which the jus-
tices did not act in accordance with this perceived
division. For example, in Wisconsin Dept. of
Health & Family Services v. Blumer, 122 S.Ct.
962 (2002), Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas joined in the majority opinion written by
Justice Ginsburg, while Justice Scalia, O'Connor,
and Stevens dissented. And in Board of Education
v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002), Justice Breyer
joined the five-justice majority finding random
drug testing of students who participate in high
school extracurricular activities to be constitu-
tional. The number of opinions with justices spe-
cially concurring in the judgment but not in all
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the reasoning will delight legal scholars and
bedevil law students for years to come. While a
change in Court membership is always a signifi-
cant event, the consistent alignment in many
close cases last term points out the especially
high stakes involved in replacing any of the jus-
tices who may retire in the near future from this
Court. Indeed, President Bush may have the
opportunity to appoint at least three justices in
the next two years.
The following is a personal selection of some of
the more significant civil cases decided by the
Supreme Court this last term.
CENSUS
In a decision determining whether North Carolina
lost a house seat and Utah gained one, the
Supreme Court rejected Utah's argument that the
U.S. Census Bureau's use of statistical sampling to
account for people missed by the 2000 census was
contrary to a constitutional mandate that "actual
enumeration" be made. Utah v. Evans, 122 S.Ct.
2191 (2002) (O'Connor, Thomas, and Kennedy,
JJ., concurring in part; Scalia, J., dissenting). In
an opinion written by Justice Breyer, the Court
ruled that the bureau's methodology was permissi-
ble under the census clause, and that some form
of sampling has been used since 1800 to deter-
mine the number of persons missing from the
census.
As a result of this decision, North Carolina kept a
House seat to which Utah believed it was entitled.
It's too early to tell if this will have an impact on
the balance of power in the House.
(Continued on Page 434)
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CIVIL RIGHTS
The Supreme Court issued four decisions limiting
the application of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) this term. At the same time, it issued
three decisions making it somewhat easier for
plaintiffs to bring other types of civil rights
actions.
Definition of Disability
In order to qualify as a disability under the ADA
based on a physical or mental impairment sub-
stantially limiting one or more major life activi-
ties, a unanimous Supreme Court held that a
claimant must initially prove that he or she has a
physical or mental impairment that limits a major
life activity. Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 122 S.Ct. 681 (2002).
The Court concluded that an employee's inability
to do repetitive work with hands and arms
extended at or above shoulder level was not suffi-
cient proof that she was substantially limited in
the major life activity of performing manual tasks.
The decision will make it more difficult for
claimants to establish they are disabled within the
meaning of the ADA.
Health and Safety
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S.Ct.
2045 (2002), a unanimous Supreme Court held
that an Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission regulation authorizing refusal to hire
an individual because the individual's perfor-
mance on the job would endanger the individual's
own health due to a disability did not exceed the
scope of permissible rule making under the ADA.
The ADA provides that an employer may refuse to
hire an otherwise qualified disabled person if the
person would pose "a direct threat to the health
or safety of other individuals in the workplace."
Although there is no express language in the ADA
permitting employers to refuse to hire a person
because the job poses a direct threat to that indi-
vidual, Chevron relied on an EEOC regulation
permitting employers to refuse to hire a person
when the job would pose a threat to that person's
health when it refused to hire Echazabal.
The Supreme Court rejected Echazabal's argu-
ment that the EEOC had no authority to make
such a regulation because Congress had refused to
provide such an exception and Congress had
specifically rejected proposed ADA language that
would have permitted employers to refuse to fire
or hire people on the grounds that the job pre-
sented a direct threat to the worker's health. The
Court found that the ADA seems to give the
EEOC a good deal of discretion in setting the lim-
its of permissible qualification standards, and
since Congress has not spoken "exhaustively" on
threats to a worker's own health, the regulation
can claim adherence to the statute so long as it
makes sense of the statutory defense for qualifica-
tion standards that are "job-related and consistent
with business necessity."
Disabilities and Seniority
The Supreme Court in US Airways, Inc. v.
Barnett, 122 S.Ct. 1516 (2002) (Stevens and
O'Connor, JJ., concurring; Scalia, Thomas, Souter,
and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) held that an
employer's showing that a requested accommoda-
tion conflicts with seniority rules is ordinarily suf-
ficient to show, as a matter of law, that an
"accommodation" is not "reasonable." However,
Justice Breyer stated in his opinion for the Court
that an employee remains free to. present evi-
dence of special circumstances that make a
seniority rule exception reasonable in the particu-
lar case. This ruling will have its primary impact
in workplaces where a collective bargaining agree-
ment provides for assignment of workers based on
seniority. However, it will also have application in
nonunionized workplaces with bona fide seniority
systems. It may be easier to show special circum-
stances that make a seniority rule exception
reasonable in the particular case in the latter
situation.
Punitive Damages for Violation of ADA
The Supreme Court has determined that punitive
damages are not available against public entities
in private suits under Section 202 of the ADA and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Barnes v.
Gorman, 122 S.Ct. 2097 (2002) (Souter,
Ginsburg, O'Connor, Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ., concurring). The plaintiff, a para-
plegic, suffered injuries that left him unable to
work full time after he was arrested and transport-
ed to a police station in a van that was not
equipped to accommodate the disabled.
The plaintiff sued the police officials for discrimi-
nating against him on the basis of his disability by
failing to maintain appropriate policies for the
arrest and transportation of persons with spinal
cord injuries in violation of Section 202 of the
Issue No. 8434
,ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
(Section 202 prohibits discrimination against the
disabled by public entities and Section 504 pro-
hibits discrimination against the disabled by
recipients of federal funding, including private
organizations.) A jury awarded the plaintiff $1
million in compensatory damages and $1.5 mil-
lion in punitive damages.
Noting that the statutes in question invoke
Congress' spending clause power, Justice Scalia's
opinion for the Court stated that it has regularly
applied a contract law analogy in defining the
scope of conduct for which funding recipients
may be held liable in money damages and in find-
ing a damages remedy available in private suits
under spending clause legislation. The Court
explained that it has held that, unlike compen-
satory damages and injunctions, punitive damages
are generally not available for breach of contract.
Pleading
Abrogating decisions from the Second and Sixth
Circuits, the Supreme Court agreed with the
majority of circuits and refused to require plain-
tiffs in civil rights actions to plead in more detail
than that required in other civil actions. In
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 122 S.Ct. 992
(2002), the Court unanimously held that a com-
plaint in an employment discrimination suit must
contain only a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Continuing Violations
An employee can recover on a hostile work envi-
ronment theory for acts occurring more than 300
days before the charge was filed with the EEOC,
as long as the acts were part of the same hostile
work environment and at least one of them
occurred within the 300-day period. National
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 122 S.Ct.
2061 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J.; O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Breyer, JJ., concurring). However,
to the extent that employees seek to recover for
discrete acts of alleged discrimination, Justice
Thomas wrote for the Court, only those acts
occurring within 300 days of the date the employ-
ee filed a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission are actionable under
Title VII.
Arbitration
In its first decision in recent years limiting the
use of arbitration in employment disputes, the
Supreme Court held that an employee's agree-
ment to arbitrate employment-related disputes
does not prevent the EEOC from bringing an
enforcement action against the employer to
obtain victim-specific remedies, such as back pay,
reinstatement, and damages. EEOC v. Waffle
House, Inc., 122 S.Ct. 754 (2002) (Rehnquist,
C.J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens explained
that, despite the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
policy favoring arbitration agreements, nothing in
the FAA authorizes a court to compel arbitration
of any issues, or by any parties, that are not
already covered by the agreement. The Court stat-
ed that the FAA does not mention enforcement by
public agencies. It ensures the enforceability of
private agreements to arbitrate, but otherwise it
does not purport to place any restriction on a
nonparty's choice of judicial forum. The ruling
will generally discourage employers from using
compulsory arbitration of employment disputes to
reduce the likelihood of EEOC enforcement
actions.
EDUCATION
No sleeping in class this term! This term demon-
strates that education, once thought of as a local
issue, has become an issue of substantial federal
significance. The Supreme Court decided four
controversial cases involving school vouchers,
random drug testing, and student privacy.
School Vouchers
In what is probably one of the most talked about
civil decisions of the 2001 term, the Supreme
Court, in a 5-4 decision, upheld a school voucher
program in Cleveland, Ohio. Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 122 S.Ct. 2460 (2002) (O'Connor and
Thomas, JJ., concurring; Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting). The pro-
gram gives children taxpayer-funded credits,
allowing them to either enroll in private schools,
enroll in charter schools, enroll in suburban pub-
lic schools (however, none of the suburban
schools agreed to participate in the program), or
remain in their current public school and receive
a $500 tutorial grant. More than 96 percent of
the children in the program chose to opt into
religious-related (principally Catholic) schools.
(Continued on Page 436)
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Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated that the Ohio voucher program did not
breach the Constitution's wall between church
and state because it offered "true private choice"
among religious and secular schools and because
it provides vouchers directly to the parents of
pupils. The chief justice found that the citizens
directed government aid to religious schools
wholly as a result of their own genuine and inde-
pendent private choice. The dissenters were of
the opinion that the program offers only an illu-
sion of free choice. In addition, the dissent claims
that the aid to the religious-related schools is not
"neutrally given."
Whether the decision will result in an increase in
voucher programs throughout the nation remains
to be seen. Some have suggested that state consti-
tutional amendments barring aid to religious
schools may be invoked by opponents of voucher
programs to discourage expansion of voucher pro-
grams. There is also a question of whether voters
desire voucher programs. Voters in Michigan and
California rejected voucher referendums by wide
margins in elections in 2000. Others have suggest-
ed that the states (12 of which considered vouch-
er proposals in their most recent sessions) will be
encouraged to enact voucher programs. In any
event, this decision may result in major changes
in the way our educational system is organized,
run, and paid for.
Drug Testing
The rights of school officials to randomly test stu-
dents for drug use was expanded by the Supreme
Court in Board of Education of Independent
School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v.
Earls, 122 S.Ct. 2559 (2002) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring; O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens,
JJ., dissenting). Writing for the majority, Justice
Thomas held that a school system's policy of test-
ing students who participate in extracurricular
activities, including Future Farmers of America,
choir, and cheerleading, was a reasonable means
of furthering the school district's important inter-
est in preventing and deterring drug use among its
pupils and does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. The district's policy required stu-
dents who participated in "competitive" extracur-
ricular activities, such as band or choir, to take a
drug test before participating in an extracurricular
activity, submit to random drug testing while par-
ticipating in the activity, and agree to be tested
for drugs at any time upon reasonable suspicion.
Students found to be using drugs were referred to
counseling and treatment.
The Court found that the pupils had a limited
expectation of privacy because, among other
things, a faculty sponsor monitors students for
compliance with the various rules dictated by
clubs and activities. In addition, the majority con-
cluded that the degree of intrusion caused by col-
lecting a urine sample-a process that includes
having a faculty monitor wait outside the closed
restroom stall, listening for the normal sounds of
urination in an effort to guard against tampered
specimens and ensuring an accurate chain of cus-
tody-is negligible.
Justice Breyer, in a special concurrence, acknowl-
edged that "not everyone would agree with this
Court's characterization of the privacy-related sig-
nificance of urine sampling as 'negligible."' Some
find the procedure to be no more intrusive than a
routine medical examination, but others are seri-
ously embarrassed by the need to provide a urine
sample with someone listening "outside the closed
restroom stall."
Lastly, the Court asserted that preventing drug
use by schoolchildren is an important governmen-
tal concern, noting that teachers had testified that
they had seen students who appeared to be under
the influence of drugs and that a drug dog had
found marijuana "near" the school parking lot.
The ruling expands on the Court's 1995 decision
(Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646
(1995)) holding that an Oregon school district,
where there was heavy drug use, could randomly
test high school athletes without a showing of
individualized suspicion. In Vernonia, the Court
found the testing to be permissible because of
concerns that any drug use during sports activi-
ties could result in injuries and because the ath-
letes had already given up some privacy rights by
joining teams and undressing in locker rooms.
Seeking some similarity between the 1995 deci-
sion and the extracurricular activities at issue in
Earls, Justice Thomas explained that, among
other things, students who participate in competi-
tive extracurricular activities voluntarily subject
themselves to many of the same intrusions on
their privacy as do athletes. He noted that some
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clubs and activities involve travel, which, in turn,
often may involve "communal undress."
Dissenting, Justice Ginsburg wrote, "If a student
has a reasonable subjective expectation of privacy
in the personal items she brings to school, surely
she has a similar expectation regarding the chemi-
cal composition of her urine." Justice Ginsburg
noted that while extracurricular activities are
"voluntary" in the sense that they are not
required for graduation, they are part of the
school's educational program and "[plarticipation
in such activities is a key component of school
life, essential in reality for students applying to
college, and for all participants, a significant con-
tributor to the breadth and quality of the educa-
tional experience." Justice Ginsburg also
expressed concern that the personal information
collected under the school district's policy may
have been handled carelessly, with little regard for
its confidentiality.
Taking aim at the majority's concern for the safety
of participants in such extracurricular activities as
Future Homemakers of America, Future Farmers
of America, and the band, Justice Ginsburg wrote:
Notwithstanding nightmarish images of out-of-
control flatware, livestock run amok, and colliding
tubas disturbing the peace and quiet of the [city
of] Tecumseh, the great majority of students the
School District seeks to test in truth are engaged
in activities that are not safety sensitive to an
unusual degree.
It remains to be seen whether schools implement
random drug testing as a result of this decision.
First, there is the cost of implementing such pro-
grams. Second, there may be considerable opposi-
tion to requiring students to provide a witnessed
urine sample in order to participate in extracur-
ricular activities. Third, one wonders how faculty
members will feel about being assigned to wait
outside closed restroom stalls to listen for the
"normal sounds of urination." Fourth, as Justice
Breyer recognized in his concurrence, some
pupils may object to random drug testing by
refusing to participate in extracurricular activi-
ties-"a price (nonparticipation) that is serious,
but less severe than expulsion from school."
More importantly, the question remains just how
far this Supreme Court will go to find "special
needs" exceptions to the constitutionally protect-
ed right of freedom from searches in the absence
of reasonable suspicion. If the "war on drugs"
is seen as justifying searches of students
without reasonable suspicion, will the "war on
terrorism" justify searches of adults without
reasonable suspicion?
Peer Grading
According to the Supreme Court, peer grading
does not violate the Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act (FERPA). Owasso Independent
School District No. I-011 v. Falvo, 122 S.Ct. 934
(2002) (Scalia, J., concurring). The Court unani-
mously held that a student assignment does not
satisfy the FERPA definition of "education
records" as soon as it is graded by another stu-
dent, so FERPA was not violated by such grading
or by calling out the scores in class. The Court
explained that, assuming the teacher's grade book
is an education record, "the score on a student-
graded assignment is not 'contained therein' until
the teacher records it; the teacher does not main-
tain the grade while students correct their peer's
assignments or call out their own marks."
The Court recognized that peer grading has sever-
al significant advantages for both teachers and the
student learning process. Justice Kennedy, a for-
mer law professor, wrote, "Correcting a class-
mate's work can be as much a part of the assign-
ment as taking the test itself. It is a way to teach
material again in a new context, and it helps show
students how to assist and respect fellow pupils."
In addition, the Court thought that without peer
grading, some teachers would cover and assign
significantly less material because of the adminis-
trative time spent outside of the classroom grad-
ing and recording students assignments. The
Court's wide-ranging discussion of pedagogy could
make one wonder whether the Court was acting
as a legislature or simply interpreting legislation.
As a result of the Court's decision, it has been
suggested that other school-related activities that
were temporarily halted in some school systems
will likely resume, including posting exemplary
student work on bulletin boards, publicly recog-
nizing students for academic achievement, and
posting the names of students who make the
honor roll.
(Continued on Page 438)
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Private Right of Action
In Gonzaga University v. Doe, 122 S.Ct. 2268
(2002) (Breyer and Souter, JJ., concurring;
Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting), the
Supreme Court addressed an issue it did not con-
sider in Owasso Independent School District No.
I-011 v. Falvo, 122 S.Ct. 934 (2002): whether
there is a private right to enforce FERPA's nondis-
closure provisions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Disagreeing with the Ninth and Second Circuits,
the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, held that provisions of FERPA pro-
hibiting federal funding of educational institutions
that have a policy or practice of releasing educa-
tion records to unauthorized persons created no
personal rights to enforce under Section 1983.
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Stevens,
joined by Justice Ginsburg, stated that the Court's
"interpretation would explain the Court's studious
avoidance of the rights-creating language in the
title and text of the Act. Alternatively, its opinion
may be read as accepting the proposition that
FERPA does indeed create both parental rights of
access to student's records and student rights of
privacy in such records, but that those federal
rights are of a lesser value because Congress did
not intend them to be enforceable by their own-
ers." According to Justice Stevens, the majority
"has eroded-if not eviscerated-the long-
established principle of presumptive enforce-
ability of rights under § 1983."
EMPLOYMENT
Family and Medical Leave Act
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)
requires employers with 50 or more employees to
provide eligible employees with up to 12 weeks of
unpaid leave per year if the employee has a seri-
ous medical condition, an immediate family mem-
ber with a serious medical condition, or a new-
born or newly adopted child to care for. In its first
case under the FMLA, the Supreme Court held
that the Department of Labor had overstepped its
authority in adopting a regulation requiring
employers to inform an employee beforehand if it
intends to count leave against that employee's
FMLA entitlement and prohibiting the employer
from retroactively designating leave as FMLA-
qualifying. Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide,
Inc., 122 S.Ct. (2002) (O'Connor, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting). In his opin-
ion for the Court, Justice Kennedy explained that
the FMLA entitles eligible employees to a total of
12 weeks of leave-not 12 weeks plus the time
the employee has already received under another
plan.
FREE SPEECH
The Supreme Court has long struggled with pro-
tecting free speech and protecting the public-
particularly children-from the unsavory and
unacceptable. In two cases this term, the
Supreme Court sharply divided on the question of
regulating sexually explicit content--on the
Internet and downtown. The Court's decisions
highlight the difficulty in drafting and applying
legislation intended to protect children from
sexually explicit materials or to regulate "adult"
businesses.
Sexually Explicit Materials on the Internet
In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521
U.S. 844 (1997), the Supreme Court held that
provisions in the Communications Decency Act of
1996 (CDA), attempting to protect children from
exposure to pornographic material on the
Internet, violated the First Amendment because,
in part, the CDA's breadth was "wholly unprece-
dented." In response to that decision, Congress
passed the Child Online Protection Act (COPA)
prohibiting the commercial display of sexually
explicit materials that are harmful to minors on
the World Wide Web. COPA defines material that
is harmful to minors by reference to contempo-
rary community standards. A federal judge in
Philadelphia blocked COPA from taking effect and
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that COPA is hopelessly flawed because it
depends on "community standards" to determine
whether materials are harmful to minors.
Reversing the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court,
in an opinion authored by Justice Thomas with
five justices concurring specially in the result and
one justice dissenting, held that COPA's reference
to contemporary community standards did not,
by itself, render COPA unconstitutionally over-
broad. Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties
Union, 122 S.Ct. 1700 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J.;
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg,
JJ., concurring; Stevens, J., dissenting).
In her opinion concurring in the result, Justice
O'Connor wrote that "adoption of a national stan-
dard is necessary in my view for any reasonable
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regulation of Internet obscenity." Justice Breyer,
who also concurred in the result, said he believed
Congress intended a nationally uniform standard
for defining what is harmful to minors. The Court
expressed no view as to whether COPA suffers
from substantial overbreadth for reasons other
than its use of community standards, whether the
statute is unconstitutionally vague, or whether the
statute would survive constitutional review under
the "strict scrutiny" standard.
Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg voted
with the majority but joined a separate opinion
saying that the national variation in community
standards could strangle the Internet if it became
law. Justice Kennedy wrote that he doubted the
measure would ever become law because there is
a very real likelihood that COPA cannot survive a
First Amendment challenge, as COPA is content-
based regulation of speech. Clearly the question of
whether COPA is impermissible content-based
regulation of speech will be before the Court in
the near future.
Virtual Child Pornography
In a case involving an issue that the founders
could never have envisioned-"virtual" child
pornography-the Supreme Court struck down
provisions of the Child Pornography Prevention
Act of 1996 (that CPPA-which is not to be con-
fused with the COPA). Justice Kennedy wrote the
opinion for the Court in Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 122 S.Ct. 1389 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring; O'Connor and Scalia, JJ., dissenting in part;
Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Court held that
speech prohibited by the CPPA's ban on virtual
child pornography is distinguishable from child
pornography, which may be banned without
regard to whether it depicts works of value.
("Virtual pornography" is sexually explicit images
that appear to depict minors but were produced
by means other than using real children, such as
through the use of youthful-looking adults or com-
puter-imaging technology.)
According to the Court, the ban on virtual child
pornography in the CPPA abridges the freedom to
engage in a substantial amount of lawful speech
and thus is overbroad and unconstitutional under
the First Amendment. The Court also held that a
provision in the CPPA banning depictions of sexu-
ally explicit conduct that "are advertised, promot-
ed, presented, described, or distributed in such a
manner that conveys the impression that the
material is or contains a visual depiction of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct" is
also substantially overbroad and in violation of
the First Amendment. This decision may presage
how the Court will handle a claim that COPA is
impermissible content-based regulation of speech.
Adult Business Ordinance
In seeking to clean up the Hollywood district by
outlawing clusters of X-rated businesses, the City
of Los Angeles enacted an ordinance making it
illegal to have more than one adult entertainment
business in the same building. In City of Los
Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 122 S.Ct. 1728
(2002) (Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., concurring;
Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting;
Breyer, J., dissenting in part), Justice O'Connor
concluded that Los Angeles could reasonably rely
on a police department study correlating crime
patterns with concentrations of adult businesses
when opposing a business's First Amendment
challenge to a city ordinance prohibiting the oper-
ation of multiple adult businesses in a single
building. The Court stated that reducing crime is
a substantial government interest justifying a
time, place, and manner regulation of speech.
The four dissenters said it was far-fetched to sug-
gest that a video parlor located in an adult book-
store would draw more crime to the area. Justice
Kennedy said the case should go back for trial to
test the city's claim that its ban on the video par-
lor would combat crime, not just deter unsavory
speech.
Judicial Speech
The Supreme Court threw out Minnesota's limits
on what judicial candidates may tell voters in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 122
S.Ct. 2528 (2002) (O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ.,
concurring; Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, J.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia concluded
for the 5-4 majority that the Minnesota Code of
Judicial Conduct violated the First Amendment
by prohibiting judicial candidates from announc-
ing their views on disputed legal or political
issues. In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor
stated that "if the state has a problem with judi-
cial impartiality, it is largely one the state brought
upon itself by continuing the practice of popularly
electing judges."
(Continued on Page 440)
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Eight states (Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, Maryland,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, and
Pennsylvania) have rules similar to Minnesota's.
At least 25 states have incorporated a clause from
the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit-
ing "statements that commit or appear to commit
the candidate with respect to cases, controversies,
or issues that are likely to come before the court."
While the Court held that the Minnesota
"announce" clause was unconstitutional, it did
not rule on the constitutionality of a "pledges or
promises clause" such as in the ABA Model Code
of Judicial Conduct. Because the Court stopped
short of simply saying that a judicial election is an
election like any other election, it is anticipated
that there will be more litigation testing the
boundaries of what limits can or cannot be placed
on a judicial candidates' speech during the elec-
tion campaign.
Advertising
In another 5-4 decision-but this time finding a
violation of the First Amendment-Justice
O'Connor struck down restrictions on advertising
and promotion of particular compounded drugs in
the Food and Drug Administration Modernization
Act. Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,
122 S.Ct. 1497 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring;
Breyer, Stevens, and Ginsburg, JJ., and Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
Door-to-Door Advocacy
An Ohio village's ordinance requiring registration
with the village's mayor and a permit before
groups could engage in door-to-door advocacy vio-
lates the First Amendment as applied to religious
proselytizing, anonymous political speech, and
distribution of handbills. Watchtower Bible &
Tract Society of New York v. Village of Stratton,
122 S.Ct. 2080 (2002) (Breyer, Souter, Ginsburg,
Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., concurring in result;
Rehnquist, C.J, dissenting). Writing for the Court,
Justice Stevens held that the ordinance is "offen-
sive-not only to the values protected by the First
Amendment, but to the very notion of a free soci-
ety-that in the context of everyday public dis-
course a citizen must inform the government of
her desire to speak to her neighbors and then to
obtain a permit to do so." The Court said that the
lack of a permit is not likely to deter criminals,
who could pose as surveyors or census takers not
covered by the ordinance. The Court suggested
that an ordinance targeted solely at commercial
solicitors might be satisfactory.
In a concurring opinion joined by Justices Souter
and Ginsburg, Justice Breyer noted that the vil-
lage had not offered any evidence to supports its
interest in crime prevention. In his dissent, Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote, "[The majority's] doc-
trine contravenes well-established precedent, ren-
ders local governments largely impotent to
address the very real safety threat that canvassers
pose, and may actually result in less of the door-
to-door-communication that it seeks to protect."
The chief justice offered as an example in support
of his premise the murder of two Dartmouth
College professors in 2002 by teenagers who went
door-to-door to conduct a purported environmen-
tal survey for school as evidence of the danger
posted by door-to-door canvassing.
PATENTS
Doctrine of Equivalents
The doctrine of equivalents protects a patented
element of design from infringement without a
showing of exact duplication. Before 2000, the
doctrine could be used if a patent holder had not
materially changed the description of that ele-
ment during the initial patent approval process.
However, if the amendment changed the overall
description of the invention, a defendant could
invoke a defense called "patent history estoppel."
In 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit held that if a patent holder had made any
amendment to its patent, the doctrine of equiva-
lents did not protect the patented element.
Reversing the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court
unanimously held that the Federal Circuit's ruling
was inconsistent with precedent and discouraged
incentives for innovation. Festo v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S.Ct. 1831
(2002). In addition, the Court said that the
retroactive application of the complete bar would
disrupt "the settled expectations of the inventing
community" and "destroy the legitimate expecta-
tions of inventors in their property." The Court
imposed a rebuttable presumption placing the
responsibility on the plaintiff to explain its
amendments. To overcome this presumption, the
drafter must show that he or she could not have
reasonably foreseen an equivalent invention at
the time the amendment was made.
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PRISONERS
The Court generally ruled against lawsuits by
prison inmates this term. Writing for the Court,
Justice Kennedy ruled that jailed sex offenders
could lose visitation and recreation privileges if
they do not admit all past sexual assaults to
prison counselors. McKune v. Lile, 122 S.Ct. 2017
(2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring; Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting. The Court
also ruled that inmates who claim they were
abused must use an internal prison complaint sys-
tem before filing a lawsuit. Porter v. Nussle, 534
U.S. 516 (2002). In a third case, the Court ruled
in an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist
that federal inmates housed in private prisons or
halfway houses cannot sue the operating compa-
nies for damages over civil rights violations.
Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 122 S.Ct.
515 (2001) (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concurring;
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dis-
senting. However, in a fourth case, the Court held
that a former inmate could sue prison officials for
chaining him to a pole. Hope v. Pelzer, 122 S.Ct.
2508 (2002).
Exhaustion of Remedies
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA)
provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with
respect to prison conditions under section
1983..., or any other Federal law, by a prisoner ...
until such administrative remedies as are avail-
able are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). In
Porter v. Nussle, a Connecticut prison inmate
filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, without
first filing an inmate grievance to complain that
corrections officers had beaten him without justi-
fication. The trial court dismissed the action,
holding that the prisoner had failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. The Second Circuit
reversed, holding that the exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies requirement covers only condi-
tions affecting prisoners generally, not single inci-
dents that immediately affect only particular pris-
oners, such as a corrections officer's use of exces-
sive force.
Disagreeing with the Second Circuit, the Supreme
Court, in an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg,
unanimously held that the PLRA applies to
inmate claims regardless of whether they involve
general circumstances or particular episodes, and
whether they allege excessive force or some other
wrong. The Court held that, even when the pris-
oner seeks relief not available in the grievance
proceedings-notably money damages-exhaus-
tion is still a prerequisite to suit. Justice Ginsburg
explained that Congress enacted the PLRA to
reduce the quantity and improve the quality of
prisoner suits. To this purpose, Ginsburg wrote,
Congress afforded corrections officials the time
and opportunity to address complaints internally
before allowing the initiation of a federal case.
Relying on the Court's earlier decision in Booth v.
Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001), Justice Ginsburg
stated that in some instances corrective action
taken in response to an inmate's grievance might
improve prison administration and satisfy the
inmate or, in other instances, the internal review
might "filter out some frivolous claims." She rea-
soned that the asserted distinction between exces-
sive force claims that need not be exhausted on
one hand and exhaustion-mandatory "frivolous"
claims on the other is untenable because exces-
sive force claims can themselves be frivolous.
According to Justice Ginsburg, "Scant sense sup-
ports the single occurrence, prevailing circum-
stance dichotomy. Why should a prisoner have
immediate access to court when a guard assaults
him on one occasion, but not when beatings are
widespread or routine?"
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Law enforcement officers generally enjoy qualified
immunity from lawsuits, unless their conduct vio-
lates the Constitution or established law. In Hope
v. Pelzer, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (2002) (Rehnquist,
C.J.; Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting), the
Supreme Court considered how officers should
know that their challenged conduct was illegal
or unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court declared unconstitutional an
Alabama prison practice of handcuffing inmates to
a metal pole in the summer heat. The plaintiff
claimed that in 1995 he was not allowed to sit or
move more than a few inches from the pole while
his arms were chained at head level, and he once
was left chained for seven hours without a bath-
room break. The plaintiff stated that guards
removed his shirt and taunted him by bringing a
bucket of water that was then given to prison dogs
and poured at his feet. The Alabama practice was
discontinued in 1998 after a federal judge found
its use to be unconstitutional.
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The Court said that prison officers should have
known the treatment was unconstitutional, and
thus they could be sued by a former inmate.
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia, dissented. He argued that tra-
ditional state immunity "has been turned on its
head." According to Justice Thomas, the question
was whether it was clearly established in 1995
that using a restraining bar violated the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ments. Justice Thomas wrote, "The answer to this
question is also simple: Obviously not."
Justice Stevens disagreed, writing for the majority,
"The obvious cruelty inherent in this practice
should have provided [prison officials] with some
notice that their alleged conduct violated [the
plaintiffs] constitutional protection against cruel
and unusual punishment." Stevens explained that
the plaintiff had been "treated in a way antitheti-
cal to human dignity-he was hitched to a post
for an extended period of time in a position that
was painful, and under circumstances that were
both degrading and dangerous."
REAL PROPERTY
Eminent Domain
In a change of pace from its recent takings cases,
the Supreme Court held that a moratorium on
development did not constitute a per se taking of
property. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 122 S.Ct.
1465 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J.; Scalia, and Thomas,
JJ., dissenting). Writing for the Court, Justice
Stevens held that the question of whether the tak-
ings clause of the Fifth Amendment requires com-
pensation when government enacts a temporary
regulation denying a property owner all viable
economic use of property is to be decided, not by
any categorical rule, but by applying a complex
set of factors, including the regulation's economic
effect on the landowner, the extent to which the
regulation interferes with reasonable investment-
backed expectations, and the character of the gov-
ernment action.
Eviction
The Supreme Court has ruled that the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act requires lease terms giving local hous-
ing authorities the discretion to terminate the
lease of a tenant when a member of the household
or a guest engaged in drug-related criminal activi-
ty on or near the premises, regardless of whether
the tenant was personally aware of or should have
been aware of such activity. Department of
Housing & Urban Development v. Rucker, 122
S.Ct. 1230 (2002) ((Breyer, J., took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case).
SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICAID
Community Spouse Resource Allowance
Wisconsin Dept. of Health & Family Services v.
Blumer, 122 S.Ct. 962 (2002) (Stevens, O'Connor,
and Scalia, JJ., dissenting), involves mind-
numbing analysis and terminology, but is an
important case affecting thousands and thousands
of persons who depend upon Medicaid for long-
term care. Medicaid is a joint federal-state pro-
gram established in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social
Security Act. Among other things, the program
provides coverage for elderly persons whose
income and resources are insufficient to meet the
costs of medical services, such as nursing home
care. The federal government provides states that
participate in the program with partial funding.
The federal government also establishes manda-
tory and optional categories of eligibility and ser-
vices covered. No state may adopt programs or
policies that violate the mandate of the Social
Security Act.
In 1988 Congress enacted the Medicare
Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA). The
MCCA seeks to protect married couples when one
spouse is institutionalized in a nursing home so
that the spouse who continues to reside in the
community is not impoverished and has sufficient
income and resources to live independently.
Before 1988, the Medicaid eligibility rules
required a couple to deplete their resources
before the institutionalized spouse was eligible for
benefits, often leaving the community spouse
impoverished and unable to live without public
assistance.
When an application for Medicaid is made, the
couple's total resources are calculated as of the
date that continuous institutionalization began for
the institutionalized spouse, and then a share of
those resources is allocated to each spouse. The
amount of resources allocated to the community
spouse is called the community spouse resource
allowance (CSRA). The CSRA is considered an
"unavailable asset" in determining the Medicaid
eligibility of an institutionalized spouse.
States have used two methods for determining the
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CSRA. Under the "income-first" method used by
most states, a community spouse's income
includes not only the community spouse's actual
income at the time of the eligibility hearing but
also an anticipated "community spouse monthly
income allowance" (CSMIA). Because the income-
first method takes account of the potential
CSMIA, that method makes it less likely that
the CSRA will be increased and tends to require
couples to expend additional resources before
the institutionalized spouse becomes Medicaid
eligible. The "resources-first" method used in
the remaining states excludes the CSMIA from
consideration.
In 1994, Irene Blumer was admitted to a nursing
home in Wisconsin. Sometime later, Irene,
through her husband Burnett, applied for
Medicaid (also referred to as Medical Assistance).
The county department of human services con-
ducted an asset assessment to determine if Irene
was eligible for Medicaid benefits. The county
determined that the Blumers had total assets of
$145,644 in 1994 when Irene was admitted to the
nursing home.
The county set Burnett's community spouse
resource allowance (CSRA) at $72,822, or one-
half of the couple's non-exempt assets. Based
upon this CSRA, the county established a total
asset limit of $74,822-$72,822 for Burnett, as
the community spouse, and $2,000 for Irene, as
the institutionalized spouse, before Irene would
be eligible for Medicaid. The county then exam-
ined the current total assets of the couple as of
the date the application for Medicaid was made
and concluded that the couple had assets of
$89,335. The county denied Irene's Medicaid
application because the Blumers were $14,513
above their asset limit of $74,822.
Irene then requested a hearing for the purpose of
setting a higher CSRA. At the hearing, it was
established that Burnett's share of assets generat-
ed $377.85 per month in interest and dividends.
When combined with his Social Security pay-
ments and payments from an annuity, the hearing
examiner concluded that Burnett's total monthly
income was $1,702.45. This amount was below
the minimum monthly maintenance needs
allowance of $1,727 established by federal law as
the minimum monthly income a community
spouse would need to live independently. Irene
argued that because the CSRA set by the county
did not have the capacity to generate sufficient
income to meet Burnett's minimum monthly
maintenance needs allowance, the examiner
should have set a higher CSRA so that Burnett
would have more assets to generate more income.
Setting a higher CSRA would allow a transfer of
assets to Burnett, making Irene eligible for
Medicaid sooner.
Relying on Wisconsin's Medicaid spousal impover-
ishment statute, the hearing officer concluded
that he could not raise the CSRA and permit a
transfer of assets to Burnett until Irene first made
all of her income available to him. By imputing
Irene's Social Security retirement income and her
pension to Burnett, the hearing examiner con-
cluded that he had a monthly income of more
than $2,000, well above the minimum monthly
maintenance needs allowance established by fed-
eral statute. The hearing officer concluded that no
additional assets above the initially established
CSRA needed to be retained by Burnett and that
the county had correctly denied Medicaid benefits
to Irene. On appeal, the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals held that application of the "income-first
rule, instead of the resources-first" method when
determining whether to increase the CSRA con-
flicted with federal law.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the
majority, Justice Ginsburg held that the income-
first prescription of Wisconsin statutes, requiring
potential income transfers from the institutional-
ized spouse to be considered part of the "commu-
nity spouse's income" for purposes of determining
whether a higher CSRA was necessary, did not
conflict with the MCCA. The dissenting justices
contended that the text of the federal statute,
which expressly authorizes the resources-first
method without mentioning the income-first
method, identifies, at the very least, a congres-
sional preference for the former.
Disability Benefits
The Social Security Administration's interpreta-
tion of a statutory definition of "disability" as
requiring that a claimant's "inability to engage in
any substantial gainful activity" last, or be expect-
ed to last, for at least 12 months, is based on a
lawful construction of the statute, according to
the Supreme Court. Barnhart v. Walton, 122 S.Ct.
1265 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring). Writing for
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the Court, Justice Breyer also upheld a regulation
providing that a return to work that takes place
both prior to the lapse of a 12-month period
after the onset of impairment and prior to an
adjudication of disability precludes a finding
that a claimant is disabled or entitled to a trial
work period.
STATES
In 1996 the Supreme Court ruled that, under the
Eleventh Amendment, states are generally
immune from private lawsuits brought under fed-
eral law. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996). Since that decision, the Supreme Court
has held that states are immune from suit in a
variety of contexts, including suits against state
agencies over patent, trademark, and copyright
infringement, age discrimination, and disability
discrimination. A sharply divided Supreme Court
continues to wrestle with cases involving sover-
eign immunity of states.
Administrative Hearings
In Federal Maritime Commission v. South
Carolina State Ports Authority, 122 S.Ct. 1864
(2002) (Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg,
JJ., dissenting), the Supreme Court extended state
sovereign immunity to adjudicative hearings by
federal administrative agencies. Writing for the
majority, Justice Thomas stated that the majority
was defending the structure of the original
Constitution even if it is "not a model of adminis-
trative convenience." He added, "By guarding
against encroachments by the federal government
on fundamental aspects of state sovereignty, we
strive to maintain the balance of power embodied
in the Constitution." Pointing out that the majori-
ty was not striking down the Shipping Act of 1916
or depriving the Federal Maritime Commission of
its power to enforce the act, Justice Thomas
stressed that all the majority was prohibiting was
a requirement that state-run ports defend them-
selves in a complaint brought by a private party.
In dissent, Justice Breyer accused the majority
of inventing a principle that is not mentioned
in the Constitution and then using it to reduce
the federal government's power to enforce pro-
gressive laws.
Supplemental Jurisdiction
In Raygor v. Regents of University of Minnesota,
122 S.Ct. 999 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part; Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting),
the Supreme Court held that a provision in the
supplemental jurisdiction statute (28 U.S.C. §
1367(d)) does not toll the statute of limitations
for claims against nonconsenting states that were
filed in federal court but subsequently dismissed
on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
In Raygor, state employees had filed complaints
in federal district court against the University of
Minnesota, alleging a federal cause of action under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) and a state law discrimination action
under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA).
In its answer, the university responded that the
federal claims were barred by the state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity. The court thereafter dis-
missed all the claims.
The employees refiled their state law claims in
state court. The university argued that the claims
were barred by the applicable state statute of limi-
tations and that the federal supplemental jurisdic-
tion statute did not toll the limitations period on
those claims because the federal court never had
subject matter jurisdiction over ADEA claims. The
state court's dismissal of the claims as untimely
was upheld by the Minnesota Supreme Court.
Upholding the Minnesota court, the majority,
through Justice O'Connor, explained that it is far
from clear whether Congress intended tolling to
apply when claims against nonconsenting states
were dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds
and that it is not relevant whether Congress acted
pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Section 5 gives Congress the power
to enact laws enforcing the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. When Congress
intends to alter the usual constitutional balance
between the states and the federal government,
the majority said, it must make its intention to do
so unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute.
The dissent, through Justice Stevens, said that
Section 1367(d) was a response to the risk that
the plaintiffs state law claim, even though timely
when filed as a part of the federal lawsuit, might
be dismissed after the state period of limitations
has expired. The dissent stated that Section
1367(d) is intended to avoid the necessity of
duplicate filings by providing that the state statute
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shall be tolled while the claim is pending in feder-
al court and for 30 days thereafter. Pointing out
that Minnesota has given consent to be sued in its
own courts for alleged violations of the MHRA,
Justice Stevens wrote, "In light of such a clear
consent to suit, unencumbered by any special
limitations period, it is evident that tolling under
§ 1367(d) similarly 'amounts to little if any broad-
ening of the [legislature's] waiver.' Given the fact
that the timely filing in Federal Court served the
purposes of the [Minnesota limitations period], it
seems to me quite clear that the application of the
tolling rule does not raise a serious constitutional
issue."
Removal to Federal Court
In an uncommon unanimous Supreme Court deci-
sion involving state sovereign immunity, the
Supreme Court held that a state waives its
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in fed-
eral court when it removes a case from state court
to federal court. Lapides v. Board of Regents, 122
S.Ct. 1640 (2002). The decision is consistent with
previous Supreme Court decisions holding that a
state's voluntary appearance in federal court
amounts to a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment
immunity. The Court explained that a rule that
finds waiver through a state attorney general's
invocation of federal court jurisdiction avoids
inconsistency and unfairness.
Regulation of HMOs
Last but not least, in one of the seemingly ho-hum
cases that in reality may have a significant impact
on the day-to-day lives of many individuals, the
Supreme Court held that the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
does not pre-empt an Illinois law requiring inde-
pendent review when a health maintenance orga-
nization and a patient disagree over whether a
course of treatment is medically necessary. Rush
Prudential HMO Inc. v. Moran, 122 S.Ct. 2151
(2002) (Rehnquist, C.J.; Scalia, Thomas, and
Kennedy, JJ., dissenting). The Court held the
independent review law was saved from preemp-
tion by 29 U.S.C. § 144(b)(2)(A), which preserves
state laws that regulate "insurance, banking, or
securities." In an opinion written by Justice
Souter, the majority stated that an HMO "cannot
checkmate common sense by trying to submerge
HMOs' insurance features beneath an exclusive
characterization of HMOs as providers of health
care." The decision may encourage states to regu-
late HMOs more closely.
American Bar Association 445
